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CONTINGENT COMPENSATION OF POST-
CONVICTION COUNSEL: A MODEST PROPOSAL TO 
IDENTIFY MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND REDUCE 
WASTEFUL GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
Christopher T. Robertson, J.D., Ph.D.* 
It costs about $25,000 per year to pay for the housing, food, medical care, and 
security for each of the 2.3 million residents of America’s prisons.1 In a world of 
limited public budgets, each of these expenditures represents an opportunity cost – 
a teacher’s aide not hired, a section of road not widened.  Local, state, and federal 
governments pay such incarceration costs, which amount to $75 billion in the 
aggregate, while slashing budgets for essential services for the rest of the citizenry 
including medical care, biomedical research, infrastructure, and educational 
funding – investments which arguably provide greater returns to taxpayers.2    
It is hard to resist the allure of some form of “justice reinvestment” that would 
move funds to areas that might produce greater social return, and indeed states have 
been experimenting with ways to save money by getting prisoners out of prison.3  
A Michigan reentry program is saving $118 million annually.4  Texas is saving 
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 1. JOHN SCHMITT, KRIS WARNER, & SARIKA GUPTA, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF 
INCARCERATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-
06.pdf; Direct Expenditures by Criminal Justice Function, 1982–2007, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/exptyptab.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2012). 
 2. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, More States Limiting Medicaid Hospital Stays, USA TODAY, Oct. 31, 
2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-23/states-limit-medicaid-hospital-
stays/50886398/1 (Arizona simply stopped paying for certain organ transplants.  Hawaii simply refused 
to pay for hospital stays of more than 10 days for most patients, regardless of whether the patient can be 
safely discharged.).  See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRATEGIES TO LEVERAGE RESEARCH 
FUNDING: GUIDING DOD’S PEER REVIEWED MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS 47 (Michael McGeary & 
Kathi E. Hanna eds., 2004), available at http://nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11089 (discussing 
sharply reduced state funding for biomedical research); Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, Grading 
the States ‘08: The Mandate to Measure, GOVERNING, Mar. 2008, at 32-34, available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Grading-the-States-2008.pdf (discussing state cuts 
to infrastructure spending); Phil Oliff & Michael Leachman, New School Year Brings Steep Cuts in 
State Funding for Schools, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?Fa=view&id=3569 (discussing state cuts to education spending). 
 3. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear, A Private-Sector, Incentives-Based Model For Justice Reinvestment, 
10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 585 (2011). 
 4. Glenn Gilbert, Success of Michigan Prisoner Re-entry Initiative Allows Granholm to Close 
Prisons, Save Money, OAKLAND PRESS, Sept. 6, 2009, http://www.theoaklandpress.com/articles/ 
2009/09/06/opinion/doc4aa2fbfc7c9f4919330267.txt. 
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$210 million by increasing probation and parole as an alternative to incarceration.5  
Several states recently have created fiscal incentives for local justice systems to 
reduce their recidivism rates, and the United Kingdom is experimenting with a 
program to create private-sector competition to reduce the rates of incarceration.6  
Post-conviction litigation could also serve those goals. 
The paper seeks to leverage the cost-savings agenda by observing that, at any 
given time, a significant number of those incarcerated in state and federal prisons 
should be released, not as a matter of social policy but simply on account of the 
facts and law of their cases.  Incarcerating these people is government waste, just as 
when the government builds bridges to nowhere.7  Even a purely rational 
government – with no commitment to liberty or concern about the problem of mass 
incarceration – would seek to minimize that waste.  The problem is that we 
presently have no way of identifying which prisoners meet that criterion.   
This contribution to a symposium on post-conviction litigation argues that the 
lack of properly-incentivized counsel is a primary problem with our failing system 
of habeas litigation.  The lack of counsel causes a great flood of frivolous petitions 
by pro se prisoners, while also preventing prisoners with meritorious claims from 
getting relief.  The lack of counsel, and more fundamentally, the lack of funding 
therefor, thus perpetuates the problem of incarceration waste.  Government-funded 
contingent compensation of post-conviction counsel may be the most promising 
way to help courts identify the bona fide cases deserving of relief, providing more 
accurate justice and saving money on net.  
In Part I, I lay out the problem of incarceration waste, identifying the types of 
prisoners who should be released even under current law and foreseeable changes 
thereto.  I also show that, without a constitutional or statutory right to counsel, even 
those prisoners that are being wastefully incarcerated are unable to persuasively 
reveal that status to their captors.   
In Part II, I present a proposal for rational governments to pay post-conviction 
counsel, but do so through a contingent fee system that would incentivize the 
attorneys to identify such prisoners and cogently present their cases to prosecutors 
and courts.  Such a contingent funding system would be more politically feasible, 
since it does not shower money upon prisoners who deserve to be there, and it 
creates the proper incentives for attorneys to provide a screening function for the 
most meritorious cases.   
In Part III, I identify other structural and doctrinal impediments to 
governments achieving a rational policy for reducing incarceration waste, and 
suggest that they be reconsidered through this lens.  I conclude that, although 
government-paid contingent compensation of post-conviction counsel may be a 
useful way to get representation for those prisoners that have the most meritorious 
claims, and to save some money for governments on the margins, it is very far from 
a solution to the overwhelming problem of mass incarceration. 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Texas & Mississippi: Reducing Prison Populations, Saving Money, and Reducing Recidivism, 
ABA CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/ 
CR203800/PublicDocuments/paroleandprobationsuccess.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 6. See Clear, supra note 3 (reviewing these trends). 
 7. Herein, references to “the government” include federal or state governments. 
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I.  THE PROBLEM OF WASTE INCARCERATIONS 
Much dispute attends the theoretical bases for institutionalized prisons, and the 
United States policy of mass incarceration is the topic of many other papers.  One 
could assert a radical thesis that incarceration is itself wasteful, to the extent that it 
is a sub-optimal mechanism for addressing the problem of criminality in society.  
Or, one could assert the somewhat narrower claim that, on the margins, there are 
certain sorts of criminals for whom any incarceration, or such long periods of 
incarceration, are unwarranted for meeting social goals of deterrence and 
punishment.  The “war on drugs” or “mandatory minimums,” for examples, may be 
very bad policies.   
Regardless of the merits of the broader claims on criminal justice policy, this 
paper offers the very modest suggestion that, even within our current paradigm of 
incarceration law, there are prisoners who should not be incarcerated at all, or not 
incarcerated for as long as they will be incarcerated.  This narrower concept of 
incarceration-as-waste presents some low-hanging fruit that does not require any 
broader reexamination of the underpinning of current criminal law and policy.  
Understood in this sense, incarceration waste exists because our pretrial and 
trial procedures do not perfectly sort those that should be incarcerated from those 
that should not. William Stuntz has previously tied the extent of incarceration to the 
inadequacy of process protections:   “Americans [have] chosen, at least tacitly, to 
punish millions more criminal defendants than in past generations, [and] we have 
also chosen to do the punishing with less justification and with sloppier 
procedures.”8  There is a real risk of false positives – those that are in prison but do 
not belong there.   
First, consider factual and procedural problems.  Though estimates vary 
considerably, it is likely that several percent of the current prison population were 
wrongly convicted in the first place, due to some mixture of false eyewitness 
testimony, unreliable forensic science, ineffective assistance of counsel, or the 
misconduct of police or prosecutors.9  Some of these facts may only come to light 
after the trial proceedings are complete.  Allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel are often the vehicle for presenting claims of innocence (alleging that 
                                                                                                                 
 8. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 264 (2011). 
 9. This literature is vast, but for a recent review, see Jon B. Gould and Richard A. Leo, One 
Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 825, 832 (2010) (“Virtually no one denies the existence of wrongful convictions, while 
the several studies on this question cap estimates at around 3% to 5% of convictions.”).  For a sense of 
the controversy compare Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2538, 165 L. Ed. 429, 456-57 (2006)(J. 
Scalia concurring, endorsing an estimate that the wrongful conviction rate for felonies is .027 percent, 
quoting a recent op-ed article by Joshua Marquis, District Attorney of Clatsop County, Oregon) with D. 
Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2006-2007) (estimating “a minimum factually wrongful conviction 
rate for capital rape-murder in the 1980s” as 3.3%, but suggesting that this is “likely a serious 
underestimate”).  For another leading voice, see Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and 
Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927 (2008) (arguing that precise estimates are difficult, but suggesting “that 
the frequency of wrongful death sentences in the United States is at least 2.3 percent”).  See also Schlup 
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325-26 (1995) (actual innocence); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 
(1970) (misconduct).   
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counsel failed to investigate exculpatory evidence, for example), and several 
circuits have held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be raised on 
direct appeal, but can only be raised in post-conviction proceedings.10  Petitioners 
raising ineffective assistance claims generally must show prejudice -- that the trial 
attorney made objectively unreasonable decisions that affected the outcome of the 
case.11  Thus, to the extent that these prisoners have meritorious claims, they will 
lead to reductions in prison time.  When those meritorious claims about factual 
innocence and procedural irregularities are not presented, or not presented well, the 
prisoners remain incarcerated, which is waste.  
In addition to the foregoing actual innocence claims and procedural problems, 
errors in judicial interpretations of the law also create false positives.  Periodically, 
our understanding of the substantive and procedural law changes in ways that 
undermine the validity of prior convictions.  Landmark changes to procedural 
rights and most changes to the substantive law that effectively decriminalize prior 
behavior or reduce the sentence therefor, may be retroactively applicable to those 
who are currently imprisoned.12   
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) proscribes the “use” of a firearm in the 
commission of a drug crime, and prior to 1995, prosecutors and courts had 
construed that crime broadly to cover situations where the defendant had simply 
had a gun in the general vicinity of drugs or proceeds.  In the 1995 Bailey v. United 
States decision, the Supreme Court instead held that the statute’s “use” element 
requires the Government to show “active employment of the firearm” in the 
crime.13  Prisoners who had been convicted under the broader reading were thus 
instantaneously rendered innocent of that crime.  Many of these claims had never 
been considered on direct appeal, or if considered were rejected given clear 
authority predating Bailey.  “The United States Sentencing Commission later 
estimated that between 1,500 and 2,200 federal defendants per year had been 
convicted under the broader reading of the statute that was ultimately rejected by 
the Court.”14  
In addition to such statutory claims, there are instances in which the Supreme 
Court, or a lower court, narrows or strikes down a state or federal statute for 
conflicting with the Constitution.15  Such a decision makes prisoners instantly 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2242 (2009). 
 11. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). 
 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2011) (“The limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which the 
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court if that right has been newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review . . . .”); Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989) (holding that cases that either place conduct beyond the power of 
lawmaking or that create watershed changes in criminal procedure could be applied retroactively to 
prisoners). 
 13. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995).  See also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 
614, 616-24 (1998) (discussing the post-conviction applicability of Bailey, and particularly whether the 
petition should be barred by the notion of procedural default). 
      14. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, 
ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 115 (2011) [hereinafter KING & HOFFMANN, HABEAS] 
(citing Report of Firearms Policy Team, Sentencing for the Possession or Use of Firearms during a 
Crime (January 2000), 5, http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/firearms.PDF).  
 15. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931, 2934-35 (2010) (retroactively 
narrowing the honest services fraud statute on due process vagueness concerns). 
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innocent as their crimes are struck out of the criminal statutes.  Given the Supreme 
Court’s emboldened approach to Constitutional scrutiny in the First Amendment, 
Second Amendment, and Commerce Clause domains, we might reasonably expect 
more such Constitutional exonerations in the future.16    
Congress and the Federal Sentencing Commission also sometimes change the 
sentencing laws or guidelines in ways that retroactively shorten sentences.  They 
did so recently to reduce the differences between prison sentences for crack versus 
powered cocaine, a disparity that had an onerous impact upon racial minorities.17  
Many who advocate for changing the national policy of mass incarceration call for 
similar legislation that could lead to current prisoners getting shorter sentences, in 
addition to changing sentencing policy prospectively.18 
Altogether then, the government and the prisoner have aligned interests in this 
subset of cases where the prisoner has a meritorious claim that he should be 
released prior to the conclusion of his sentence.  The prisoner seeks his freedom, 
and the government seeks to stop wasting funds incarcerating those that should not 
be incarcerated.  Presumably, the government also has a principled commitment to 
desist from wrongfully incarcerating its citizens, though this commitment may 
sometimes be less salient for policymakers, who may feel little solidarity with their 
imprisoned and disenfranchised constituents.19  Prisoners form the classic insular 
minority who are unlikely to command the attention of the political process for 
their own sake. 
Even if the government were to acknowledge this fiscal interest in reducing 
improper incarceration in the aggregate, the problem is that the government does 
not know, with particularity, which of its millions of prisoners should be released.  
In fact, even the prisoner himself often will not know whether he has a meritorious 
claim for release (although he may well hope and believe).  Both these parties need 
help in order to discover whether their interests are in fact aligned.  But 
particularized information is costly.  That information simply does not exist until 
an attorney -- who takes the time and some outlay of expenses to investigate the 
facts and law of the case -- creates that information.     
                                                                                                                 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct 1577, 1582-83, 1593 (2010) (using the First 
Amendment to strike down the statute proscribing creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal 
cruelty); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (using the Second Amendment to strike 
down gun laws).  As of the time of this writing, it appears that the Supreme Court has some likelihood 
of striking down the Affordable Care Act, on Commerce Clause grounds.  A vast portion of federal 
crimes are justified on that same Constitutional basis. 
 17. John Schwartz, Drug Terms Reduced, Freeing Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/us/terms-for-crack-cocaine-reduced-freeing-prisoners.html 
(discussing the reforms to the crack cocaine sentencing disparity in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and 
the Federal Sentencing Commission’s decision to make those changes retroactive).  See also Arthur H. 
Garrison, Disproportionate Incarceration of African Americans: What History and the First Decade of 
Twenty-First Century Have Brought, 2011 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 87, 97 (discussing Federal 
Sentencing Commission estimates that retroactive application would affect over 12,000 prisoners). 
 18. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Sentencing Reform Amid Mass Incarcerations-Guarded Optimism, 
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 27-28; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass 
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1286 (2004). 
 19. See generally, Rosanna M. Taormina, Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the 
“Usual Residence” Principle, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 431 (2003). 
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An attorney is essential to a successful post-conviction petition.20  “Proceeding 
pro se is particularly dangerous because state [and federal] post-conviction 
procedures are generally marked by strict pleading requirements, inflexible filing 
deadlines, elaborate preclusion doctrines, and other technical pitfalls that cannot 
practicably be navigated without highly skilled counsel.”21  It is particularly 
dangerous to proceed pro se or with unskilled post-conviction attorneys, because a 
botched job may actually make matters worse, effectively waiving whatever claims 
the prisoner could have made properly.22 
Public defenders’ focus their efforts on plea negotiations, trials, and direct 
appeals, not on post-conviction litigation, and the budgets of non-profit 
organizations and law school clinics can barely scratch the surface of the prison 
population.23  Thus, for a prisoner to get post-conviction counsel, he or she must be 
able to pay for it.  This is, of course, a significant challenge for a prisoner who may 
have been impoverished prior to his arrest, and even if wealthy may have 
bankrupted himself paying trial and appellate counsel.  Once in prison, the few 
dollars a day working in the prison laundry, at less than even the minimum wage, 
do not even start to pay the rates demanded by skillful post-conviction counsel.24   
Oddly, over half the states have statutes allowing compensation for those who 
are wrongly convicted and later exonerated, but no compensation for the attorneys 
who achieve that outcome.25  Federal capital defendants do have some statutory 
rights to compensated counsel.26  Some states provide very minimal compensation 
for attorneys representing capital prisoners, but most states provide no 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction 
Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 349 (2003) (“These recent changes 
[to the post-conviction relief statutes] place an incalculable premium on competent representation by 
talented, adequately funded lawyers.”). 
 21. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral 
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 354 (2006). 
 22. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) (holding that indigent defendants have 
no remedy for claims that are barred by a post-conviction lawyer’s malpractice). 
 23. Diane E. Courselle, When Clinics Are “Necessities, Not Luxuries”: Special Challenges of 
Running a Criminal Appeals Clinic in a Rural State, 75 MISS. L. J. 721, 726-27 (2006) (“Given its 
limited resources and some legal restrictions, the state public defenders handle very few state post-
conviction and no federal post-conviction matters . . . .The hardest part of the task is learning to turn 
down possibly meritorious post-conviction cases, even though without the clinic’s help an inmate may 
have no other resources for assistance.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners are not 
entitled to federal minimum wage protections). 
 25. See Reforms by States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/ 
LawView1.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (select “State Compensation Laws” from the drop-down 
menu). 
 26. For indigent federal prisoners seeking to vacate a death sentence, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) 
(2011) entitles them to appointed counsel.  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2261(b)-(c) (2011) 
(“AEDPA”), incentivizes states to create a system for the “appointment, compensation, and payment of 
reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel” in capital cases, in exchange for a dramatically 
shorter statute of limitations.  However, few (or no) states have taken advantage of this provision.  See 
Betsy Dee Sanders Parker, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”): 
Understanding the Failures of State Opt-in Mechanisms, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1981 (2007)). 
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compensation at all for non-capital prisoners.27  A plurality of the Supreme Court 
has said that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, even for death-sentenced inmates.28  The statutes provide that federal 
prisoners are not entitled to appointed counsel unless they can first formulate a 
compelling claim for relief that itself requires effective discovery and/or an 
evidentiary hearing, or alternatively if they can persuade the court that “interests of 
justice so require.”29  Of course accomplishing these predicate tasks would 
normally require the skills and resources of an attorney, making it an exquisite 
Catch-22.   
It is therefore not surprising that the vast majority of post-conviction petitions 
are written by prisoners pro se, and thus it is not surprising that most petitions fail, 
often without even reaching the merits.30  All this chaff hides any wheat, and 
wastes judicial resources too.  Meanwhile, many meritorious post-conviction 
claims are never even asserted, since only an attorney would recognize the basis for 
relief. 
It thus seems clear that the lack of legal representation is a large part of the 
problem with post-conviction litigation.31  Many pro se petitions fail to meet 
rudimentary standards of comprehensibility, much less present colorable legal 
arguments.32 In capital cases, 92.9% of the petitioners have attorneys, but in non-
capital cases, only 7.7% have attorneys.33  A simplistic comparison of outcomes 
shows that the capital defendants are 35 times more likely to get relief (12.4% of 
the time versus 0.35% of the time).34  While it is possible that this difference in 
outcomes is because capital cases are more prone to error, or that courts are more 
receptive to capital defendants, some of that disparity is likely due to the fact of 
                                                                                                                 
 27. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 276 n.97 
(2006).  See also Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644, 650 (Fla. 2002) (discussing Florida’s provisions for 
compensation of post-conviction counsel in death penalty cases).   
 28. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion). But see Jackson v. State, 732 
So. 2d 187, 191 (Miss. 1999) (holding that state capital prisoner is entitled to appointed counsel). 
 29. Rebecca C. Raquet & Sara Stainback, Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 89 GEO. L.J. 1832, 
1870-71 (2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (2000)). 
 30. See Stevenson, supra note 21, at 355; KING & HOFFMANN, HABEAS supra note 14, at 81-82 
(discussing the low rates of success), 147 (showing that 92% of non-capital petitioners proceed without 
counsel). 
     31. Nonetheless, scholarship on the efficacy of representation is mixed in its findings and in its 
reliability.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Greiner & Cassandra Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal 
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make? 121 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL (forthcoming 2012) (reviewing this literature and presenting a randomized trial of efficacy in 
the civil context) and Daniel J. Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan P. Hennessy, The 
Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and 
Prospects for the Future, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1948286. 
 32. See Joseph Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y TIMES, April 
16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/opinion/17hoffmann.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter 
Hoffmann & King, Justice] (“Because more than 90 percent of all non-capital habeas petitions are filed 
by prisoners acting as their own lawyers, the petitions are often difficult to decipher in the first place.”). 
 33. See KING & HOFFMANN, HABEAS, supra note 14, at 147. 
 34. Id.  There appears to be no prior scholarly research providing a more sophisticated analysis of the 
impact of representation in the post-conviction context.  See generally Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 
31 (reviewing the substantial literature in a variety of other fields). 
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representation, which is so disproportionately distributed across those two groups.  
Although far from a complete analysis, this data suggests that representation of 
non-capital prisoners could lead to a small, but significant, number of releases.       
II.  COMPENSATION OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL AS A SOLUTION 
These observations suggest that state and federal governments are sub-
optimally incentivizing the production of post-conviction counsel services to 
accomplish the rational goal of identifying and eliminating wasteful incarcerations.  
From a strictly rational and fiscal point of view, government should invest in the 
production of this sort of information insofar as the cost of that information is 
lower than the cost of continued incarceration.   
The most obvious way to undertake such a program of investment would be 
for the government to significantly increase its funding for the public defender 
system, so that the public defenders could allocate a significant portion of their 
work to post-conviction litigation.  The advantage of this approach is that public 
defenders already have a familiar place and expertise in the American system of 
criminal litigation.  A disadvantage is that public defenders lack any incentive to 
pursue such cases vigorously, and the salaries offered by these offices may fail to 
attract the strongest candidates to undertake this highly-complex work.35  More 
importantly, we lack any clear sense of what level of investment in such an office 
would be optimal, since we are unaware of how many meritorious claims exist and 
how much work and skill will be required to reveal them.   And finally, it seems 
that additional spending on public defenders may be politically infeasible, as it is a 
crude policy that seems to serve the guilty more than the innocent. 
Alternatively, a program of investment could be based on the private market 
for legal representation and based on a contingent fee paid if, and only if, an 
attorney succeeds in reducing the sentence of a prisoner.  This reduction in 
sentence, and thus a reduction in the government’s cost of incarceration, would 
create the corpus from which to pay the attorney.  The fee could be based on a 
simple proportion of that estimated amount saved, say 50%.  Alternatively, like the 
statutory fee paid to civil rights attorneys for prevailing parties, the payment could 
be based on a “lodestar” rate, derived from a reasonable hourly rate but multiplied 
by a factor to recognize the low chances of prevailing.36  The award could still be 
capped, however, by the estimated amount saved by the government, again to 
ensure that this program is money-saving on net.  The attorney securing the release 
would have the burden of proving his entitlement for fees, just as in other 
litigation.37   
                                                                                                                 
 35. See New Findings on Salaries for Public Interest Attorneys, NALP (September 2008), 
http://www.nalp.org/2008sepnewfindings (tables showing that public defenders are paid salaries 
significantly lower than attorneys at private law firms, for example in 2008, $47,000 for an entry-level 
public defender versus $80,00 for a private attorney at the smallest-sized firm and up to $145,000 at 
larger firms). 
 36. See Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing lodestar in civil rights 
context).  See also Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 
636-37 (1993) (discussing the Independent Counsel Act, which provides contingent compensation to 
attorneys who represent executive branch officials who are subject to investigations). 
 37. See 20 C.J.S. Costs § 169 (2009) (party requesting fees has burden). 
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The advantage of a contingent fee is that it incentivizes precisely what the 
government needs – a search function in which attorneys efficiently sort the wheat 
from the chaff, identifying those prisoners that have meritorious claims for post-
conviction relief.  Such contingently-funded attorneys will have no incentive to 
clog the courts with frivolous claims for post-conviction relief, since any such 
claim would require the investment of time and money without promise of return.38  
Because the payment is only triggered by a recognition that the prisoner should not 
be imprisoned, such targeted and purposeful public funding may be more 
politically feasible than unconditional funding for public defenders, whose 
professional obligation will invariably be to help the innocent and guilty alike. 
This proposal encounters the ethical rule against attorneys accepting 
contingent fees for criminal work, embodied in Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.5(d)(2).  The rule provides that, “[a] lawyer shall not enter into an 
arrangement for, charge, or collect . . . a contingent fee for representing a defendant 
in a criminal case.”39  Arguably, its plain language would not apply to the post-
conviction setting, since a prisoner is no longer a defendant in a criminal case, but 
is instead a petitioner in a civil case (albeit one seeking to overturn his criminal 
conviction).40  In addition, even in formal terms, the arrangement is not a 
contingent representation from the client, but a government offer for the successful 
representation of the innocent. 
Even supposing that the rule would apply to cases like this, there are good 
reasons to think that it should not.  Historically, scholars and policymakers were 
hostile to contingent fee arrangements generally, but the proscriptions have been 
eroded in almost every sector, except for criminal litigation.41   In a seminal article 
on the rule, Pamela Karlan has argued that “courts and commentators have offered 
only sketchy justifications for” maintaining the rule in the criminal context.42  The 
one official justification for the rule appears in the Model Code’s Ethical 
Consideration 2-20: “Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements 
in criminal cases, largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not 
produce a res with which to pay the fee.”43  Aside from the merits of this 
justification, it obviously does not apply to the present proposal for public funding 
of post-conviction counsel, which is motivated by the idea that there is in fact a res, 
namely the savings from the cost of incarceration.  
                                                                                                                 
 38. Compare Hoffman & King, Justice, supra note 32 (stating that “the never-ending stream of 
futile petitions suggests that habeas corpus is a wasteful nuisance” under the status quo), with Karlan, 
supra note 36, at 630 (discussing a similar dynamic in civil cases: “commentators generally assume that 
this sort of gatekeeping in damages cases is good, at least insofar as it screens some cases out of the 
system, because it provide[s] the first line of defense against frivolous litigation.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  See also A. C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for 
Allocating Criminal Appellate Counsel, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1161, 1174-76 (1997) (arguing for 
contingent payment for government-funded appellate counsel in order to create proper incentives to 
invest in the most meritorious cases). 
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2011). 
 40. See White v. Thaler, 610 F.3d 890, 897 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that civil procedures apply to 
Section 2255 petitions). 
 41. See Karlan, supra note 36, at 602. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20(2) (1983)). 
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A second traditional justification for the ban on contingent fees is that in 
criminal cases, unlike civil cases, defendants enjoy a Constitutional right to counsel 
(paid by the state if necessary), making the contingent-compensation of counsel 
unnecessary.44  The thinking is that a contingent fee, which the rule-writers saw as 
inherently suspect, is just not necessary in this context.  However, as already noted, 
there is no Constitutional right to counsel in the post-conviction setting.45   
In light of these failures of the traditional justifications, Karlan provides her 
own alternative justifications for the ban on contingent fees in criminal litigation.  
One concern is cross-subsidization of the costs of defense, in a way that seems 
normatively troublesome.  The problem is that contingent criminal fees would 
cause those who succeed in litigation and thus pay the fee – those defendants 
adjudged to be innocent, to cross-subsidize the costs of litigation for those who fail 
in litigation – defendants adjudged to be guilty.46  This concern clearly does not 
apply to the present proposal since the government pays the contingent fee rather 
than the innocent person.47  There is no problem of cross-subsidization across 
defendants. 
Karlan also argues that the gatekeeping function inherent in contingent fees, 
whereby attorneys are incentivized to select the cases with the best chances of 
success, would be inappropriate in the criminal setting.  “To permit, let alone 
systematically encourage, attorneys to choose clients based upon an assessment of 
guilt or innocence would mean that ‘[t]he private judgment of individual lawyers 
would in effect be substituted for the public, institutional judgment of the judge and 
jury.’”48  Karlan acknowledges that this concern is predicated on “the constitutional 
entitlement to counsel accorded all criminal defendants,” which does not apply 
here.49  Thus, the idea that attorneys would sort frivolous from meritorious claims, 
and focus their efforts on the latter, is not problematic.   Instead, it is exactly what 
we need – someone to perform the function of revealing which prisoners’ 
incarcerations are wasteful.  For these reasons, it appears that Rule 1.5(d)(2) would 
not and should not bar the government from paying post-conviction attorneys 
conditional on success.50 
One problem with my proposal to think about post-conviction litigation as a 
means of cost savings is that incarceration is conducted on an industrial scale, 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 603-04.  
 45. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 46. Karlan, supra note 36, at 625 (“Thus, if innocent defendants choose a contingent fee 
arrangement, they will pay a premium tied not only to error costs in their class of cases, but also to the 
lawyer’s need for compensation in cases in which the system reaches accurate verdicts against guilty 
defendants.”). 
 47. Karlan herself endorses the concept of a government-paid bonus system for defense counsel.  
See id. at 634-35. 
 48. Id. at 631 (quoting Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 
HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (1975)). 
 49. See id. at 630. 
 50. For other discussions of the ethical prohibitions, see generally Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise 
of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1992); Adam Silberlight, 
Gambling with Ethics and Constitutional Rights: A Look at Issues Involved with Contingent Fee 
Arrangements in Criminal Defense Practice, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2004); and Lindsey N. 
Godfrey, Note, Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Commonsense Approach to 
Asset Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1699 (2001). 
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where the marginal cost to imprison one extra person may not be the same as the 
average cost.  The bonds on the buildings must still be repaid, and the guards must 
still come to work, regardless of whether one person succeeds in getting his 
sentence shortened or overturned.51  Still, many states have already squared this 
circle by enacting “pay to stay” laws, which calculate an approximate cost per 
inmate and then impose it upon those few inmates that are able to pay those costs.52  
While such laws are often symbolic (since most prisoners are destitute), they 
suggest that it is possible to put a sizeable dollar figure on a day of incarceration. 
State and federal governments are also increasingly using private prisons.53  In 
that context, the problem of determining a meaningful and sizeable marginal-cost 
of imprisonment disappears because “almost all the planned or existing private 
prisons operate on a per-diem, per capita basis.”54  Thus, for jurisdictions that have 
outsourced their incarceration function with these sorts of contracts, each prisoner 
released creates a direct reduction in expenditures.  Marginal cost is average cost in 
that situation. 
Some governments also have severely overcrowded prisons, and are facing 
judicial mandates to dramatically reduce prison populations.55  These governments 
should be interested in any proposal that could reduce prison populations, even if 
only in modest numbers.  They should be particularly interested in removing the 
prisoners that do not belong there in the first place, since “high recidivism rates 
must serve as a warning that mistaken or premature release of even one prisoner 
can cause injury and harm.”56  The present proposal is a narrow and tailored way to 
reduce prison populations, focusing on those who do not belong there anyway.  
While the proposal does not purport to solve larger issues of incarceration policy or 
overcrowding, it does help on the margin. 
For the remainder of governments, my proposal relies on the hope that post-
conviction litigation may reduce enough sentences to create an aggregate cost 
savings.  If the economic argument ultimately founders, one might retreat to the 
familiar position that government should err on the side of liberty, getting people 
out of prison that do not belong there.   
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Clear, supra note 3, at 592 (discussing another proposal for using incentives to reduce 
incarceration:  “If 1 year of incarceration costs an average of $40,000, then the 16 people who do not go 
to prison will ‘save’ $640,000.  These savings are not real, of course, because diverting 16 people from 
prison does not enable the corrections system to close a prison, so its budget remains essentially 
unaffected”). 
 52. See Joshua Michtom, Note, Making Prisoners Pay For Their Stay: How A Popular Correctional 
Program Violates The Ex Post Facto Clause, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 187, 188-89 (2004) (“The first state 
to enact legislation allowing the recovery of general incarceration costs was Michigan, in 1984.  Since 
that time, at least fifteen other states have enacted similar laws.”).  
       53. See Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison, and William J. Sabol, U.S. Department of Justice Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2010, 7 (revised 2012) http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf 
(“About 16% of federal prisoners  (33,830) and nearly 7% of state  prisoners (94,365) were housed in  
private facilities[.]”). 
 54. David Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE 
L.J. 815, 831, n.92 (1987). 
 55. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (holding that California’s overcrowded prisons 
violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 56. Id. 
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III.  OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO REDUCING INCARCERATION WASTE 
Even if the government invested optimally in creating advocates for the 
prisoners that should be released, there are other structural, statutory, and doctrinal 
impediments to securing such releases at optimal rates.  These suggest further 
opportunities for reform once governments take seriously the problem of 
incarceration waste. 
The first problem is that the habeas decisionmakers may be unable to assess 
the merits of petitions objectively.  Confirmatory bias is the psychological dynamic 
by which people tend to discount information that conflicts with what they believe 
and to instead focus upon information that coheres with what they already 
believe.57  The federal habeas statutes are a recipe for such bias because they send 
petitioners back to the same prosecutors and judges that made the original 
mistakes, wrongly interpreting a statute or wrongly crediting the testimony of a 
lying witness, for examples.58   
The quickest and cheapest way to resolve a case of incarceration waste is for a 
prisoner to garner the prosecutor’s consent to his release, and in a time of fiscal 
austerity, one could imagine government executives exercising their discretion to 
instruct their line-prosecutors to consent to a prisoner’s release when he or she 
presents a colorable claim.  Of course, without such executive-level direction, line 
prosecutors will routinely resist any suggestion that the prisoner that they worked 
so hard to put away should be released, as that would mean that the prosecutor had 
been part of a terrible injustice.59  In order to get a more objective assessment of 
whether incarceration waste exists, the government could place the review of post-
conviction petitions in the hands of an independent office, not unlike the Office of 
the Inspector General, which roots out waste in other federal government 
agencies.60  One could also imagine a rational government reinstituting the use of 
parole boards and expanding their discretion to consider claims that the law 
requires release.61  Such uses of executive discretion are likely to be cheaper to the 
government than litigation in the courts. 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation To Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIBERTY 512, 516-18 (2007); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138-48 (2004). 
 58. Section 2254 requires that state prisoners first exhaust their remedies in state court, and then the 
federal courts defer strongly to state court determinations.  28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2011).  Section 2255 
requires filing in the district court that imposed the original sentence, regardless of the prisoner’s place 
of incarceration.  Id. § 2255(a) (requiring that the petition be filed in “the court which imposed the 
sentence”). 
 59. For example, even after the Supreme Court narrowed the firearms use statute in Bailey, a 
subsequent defendant convicted under that statute, Kenneth Bousley, still had to go all the way back to 
the Supreme Court to get relief.  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616-18 (1998) (discussing the 
post-conviction applicability of Bailey).  There are contrary examples, where prosecutors themselves 
became champions for releasing innocent prisoners.  See Mark Godsey, False Justice and the ‘True’ 
Prosecutor: A Memoir, Tribute, and Commentary, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 789 (2012). 
 60. See Winters Ranch P’ship v. Viadero, 123 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing the 
Inspector General Act of 1978). 
 61. See generally, Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno M. Garoupa, & Joanna Shepherd, Legislatures, 
Judges, and Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 1037, 1045-47 (2010) (discussing the historical movement away from parole board discretion). 
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If an entreaty to the prosecutor fails, a post-conviction petitioner then asks the 
trial court to admit that it deprived the petitioner of his due process rights, 
misinterpreted the law, or otherwise somehow failed to reach the right outcome in 
the case.  The judge reviewing the post-conviction petition is likely also to suffer 
from confirmatory biases, no matter how hard she tries to be fair.  Obviously a 
judge would disqualify herself if she thought she would be biased, but as the 
Supreme Court has recognized, “[b]ias might exist in the mind of one who was 
quite positive that he had no bias.”62   The Supreme Court has also recently held 
that due process is violated when a judge decides a case where there is a strong 
appearance of possible bias.63  In this light, it is anomalous for our post-conviction 
statutes to give trial judges the primary task of determining whether error occurred 
in their own prior cases.  
To make matters worse, appellate review of post-conviction denials is very 
circumscribed.  The petitioner is not even allowed to appeal the trial court’s 
decision on the petition, unless the trial court or circuit court grants him permission 
to do so.64  In the rare instance that a petitioner gets a “certificate of appealability”, 
he then must go back to the same court of appeals – and often the very same panel 
– that denied his direct appeal.   
If legislators were to take seriously the problem of incarceration waste, they 
might consider changing the venue requirements to instead allow fresh eyes to 
review convictions, at least in those cases where attorneys have identified cases as 
being potentially meritorious, worthy of investment of their own time.  The 
disadvantage of such a venue change is that the new judge may lack familiarity 
with the facts of a case, which the prior judge may have.  Of course, this is a 
contingent claim that would seem to depend on a particular judge having accurate 
and useful memories of one case, out of the thousands he has processed.   In many 
cases, were memories are limited, the judge will need to be provided with the facts 
through briefing and perhaps an evidentiary hearing.  While facts can be provided 
to a new judge, nothing can remove the confirmatory bias from the mind of the 
prior judge.   Thus, on net, a change of venue seems likely to serve accuracy in 
post-conviction determinations, and be close to neutral with regard to efficiency. 
Aside from the venue statutes, there are also a variety of judicial and statutory 
doctrines that perpetuate incarceration waste, purportedly to promote “finality” in 
criminal sentencing.  One such impediment is the statutes of limitations, which 
prevent meritorious, but stale, claims from being heard.  The allowed periods tend 
to be very short.  For example the federal period for post-conviction petitions is 
one-year, which is on the short range for such statutes generally and indeed one 
fifth of the five-year period that prosecutors enjoy to put people into prison in the 
first place.65   Aside from the facial disparity, the short period is particularly 
onerous for petitioners who are imprisoned, without income or access to attorneys.   
                                                                                                                 
 62. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909). 
 63. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (a case where a state court judge 
had benefited from significant campaign contributions from a litigant). 
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). 
 65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012) (creating a one-year period for filing post-conviction petitions); 
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012) (creating a default period of five years for prosecution of most federal 
crimes). 
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Does a short statute of limitations make sense in this context?  Notably, the 
incarcerating government is not like a civil defendant who seeks “repose,” a 
confidence that he will not face future liability.  Instead, the government is making 
payments on a judgment every month for the costs of incarceration.  From this 
perspective, a statute of limitations may be irrational, to the extent that it prevents 
meritorious claims from being heard.  If it is justified at all, a short statute of 
limitations must serve the government’s interest in minimizing transaction costs, 
allowing courts and prosecutors to quickly dispose of the non-meritorious cases.  
For the reasons suggested above, however, it is unlikely that contingently-paid 
attorneys would bring many such cases.    
Although the structure and statutes for post-conviction review are onerous, 
several court-made doctrines further circumscribe the possibilities for reducing 
incarceration waste.  Supreme Court doctrine has held that most reforms to 
criminal procedure will not be retroactively applicable to other petitioners whose 
rights were admittedly violated prior to the Supreme Court recognizing that their 
rights were violated.66   The doctrine of non-retroactivity ensures that people will 
continue to be imprisoned who otherwise would be released if the contemporary 
understanding of the applicable law were applied to their cases.  Without any basis 
in the statutory law, the judiciary has unilaterally decided that it will not consider 
such cases, and thereby externalizes the cost of incarceration onto the taxpayers.   
The court-made doctrine of “procedural default” likewise functions to keep 
people in prisons who should not be there, according to our contemporary 
understandings of the law.67  The idea is that a defendant who has failed to raise a 
challenge on appeal cannot later benefit from the Supreme Court deciding in 
another case that the challenge was meritorious.  There are certain exceptions, 
predicated on whether the defendant can show that the question goes to the trial 
court’s jurisdiction, or that the defendant had cause for not raising it and was 
prejudiced, or finally that he is “actually innocent.”68  The Supreme Court has 
(sometimes) said that, even though a claim may have been entirely futile, that does 
not demonstrate “cause” for failing to assert it.69   
Moreover, the Supreme Court has articulated the “actual innocence” standard 
oddly and incoherently.  District courts are supposed to prognosticate about 
whether any “reasonable” juror would convict in light of the changed law and new 
evidence, rather than discerning what a full jury of twelve would decide, as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.70  Even though “properly instructed” jurors would 
presume innocence and place the burden on the prosecutors, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989) (holding that only those cases that place 
conduct beyond the power of lawmaking or that create watershed changes in criminal procedure could 
be applied retroactively to prisoners). 
 67. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998). 
      68.  See generally, id. 
 69. Id. at 623.  But see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (where “the state of the law at the time . 
. . did not offer a ‘reasonable basis’ upon which to challenge the [plea],’ [it] constitutes ‘cause for failing 
to raise the issue at that time.’”). 
 70. Compare Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995) (petitioner must demonstrate that “no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him.”) with U.S. CONST. art. III and U.S. CONST.  amend. VI 
(right to a jury trial) and Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (the Constitution requires a jury of 
twelve) and Andres v. U.S., 333 U.S. 740 (1948) (the jury’s verdict must be unanimous).    
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seems to require that the petitioner prove his innocence, under a new standard to 
which he never confessed guilty.71  In that inquiry, the Supreme Court sometimes 
says that the trial court should consider even inadmissible evidence, and other 
times suggests the contrary.72 Further, even individuals who are indisputably 
innocent of the crime of their conviction nonetheless will continue to be 
incarcerated, unless they can prove their innocence of other charges, which the 
government has never even brought or proven.73  These other hypothetical charges 
can become the post-hoc justification for continued incarceration, unless the 
petitioner can prove his innocence thereof, without the benefit of a right to a jury, 
which is somehow waived by pleading guilty to other (invalid) charges.  Even aside 
from fundamental fairness and due process, the idea of incarceration waste suggests 
that the prosecutors should instead bear the burden of showing why public funds 
should continue to be used to incarcerate someone who is actually innocent of the 
crime of their conviction.   
There is thus a range of statutory and court-made obstacles to rooting out 
incarceration waste.  Of course, there are also costs to consider on the other side of 
the ledger.  Post-conviction review imposes a burden on prosecutors and courts, 
and sometimes it may be more efficient to simply deny prisoners a meaningful 
review.  (Whether it is just or fair is of course another question.)  Still, the idea of 
incarceration waste suggests that, even aside from notions of fundamental fairness, 
there are reasons to keep open the doors to post-conviction review.   And, besides, 
the contingent funding of post-conviction attorneys is likely a more accurate and 
efficient way to sort the wheat from the chaff. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This symposium article has argued that a lack of counsel is a primary problem 
with our failing system of post-conviction litigation, and the idea of incarceration 
waste presents a counterbalance to the traditional preference for finality in criminal 
sentences.  Just as other forms of governmental waste can be efficiently rooted out 
and extirpated from state and federal budgets, the wrongful incarceration of 
prisoners – who do not belong there, under even our current understandings of the 
law, can also be excised.   
To be sure, contingent compensation of post-conviction counsel is not the 
solution to our irrational system of mass incarceration.  That will take changes to 
substantive criminal laws and sentencing policy, along with more aggressive efforts 
to exonerate the wrongfully convicted.   
The idea of incarceration waste is a modest reminder that the government and 
some of the imprisoned have aligned interests in identifying those that should be 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Compare Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624 (putting the burden on “petitioner [to] demonstrate … that he 
did not ‘use’ a firearm as that term is defined in Bailey”) with Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) 
(trial court's failure to give instruction on presumption of innocence resulted in violation of defendant's 
right to fair trial.). 
 72. Compare Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624 (“the Government is not limited to the existing record but 
may present any admissible evidence of petitioner's guilt”) with Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28 (“the district 
court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial”).   
 73. See Bousley, 523 U.S at 624 (requiring that the petitioner prove innocence of “foregone 
charges”). 
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released.  A rational government would, at the very least, provide contingent 
funding to attorneys who successfully perform that service, and moreover review 
its other statutes and doctrines that place unreasonable impediments on the 
achievement of this policy goal.   
 
